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New regulations typically encourage thinking
about ways to evade or profit from changed cir-
cumstances, despite "an ongoing quest for an
equilibrium among all parties: regulators, legisla-
tors, operators and consumers."' Depending on
one's perspective, clever and unanticipated out-
comes help blunt the adverse and meddlesome
impact of regulations, or prevent regulation from
fully achieving essential public policy objectives.
Perhaps because of the pace of technological and
marketplace change, legislators and regulators
have unwittingly created an inordinate number of
opportunities for stakeholders to exploit inconsis-
tencies in the nature and scope of telecommuni-
cations regulation. 2 Asymmetries in regulatory
burdens create incentives to find ways to exploit
artificial competitive advantages and avoid regula-
tory classifications that create a bias toward more
pervasive and costly regulatory burdens.3 Asym-
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I See Michela Cimatoribus et al., Impacts of the 1996 Tele-
communications Act on the U.S. Model of Telecommunications Pol-
icy, 22 TELECOMM. POL'v 493, 509 (1998).
2 With rather high frequency, appellate courts have re-
jected the Federal Communication Commission's ("FCC" or
"Commission") interpretation of a legislative mandate or a
Commission unilateral rulemaking initiative. For example,
on several occasions the FCC unsuccessfully attempted to
mandate the elimination of a statutorily imposed tariff filing
reqtuirement:
Commission efforts to move to a no tariff environment
for interexchange carriers-insofar as those carriers do
not exercise market power-have not had an easy time
with this court and the Supreme Court. For over six de-
cades a tariff regime was mandated by the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, which requires the FCC to review tele-
communications carriers' tariffs to ensure their
reasonableness. The Act requires carriers to file their tar-
iffs with the FCC, and they are prohibited from charging
consumers except as provided in the tariffs. Starting in
the early 1980s, the Commission tried to prohibit tariff-
filing by nondominant carriers-in essence, those other
than AT&T-but that effort was successfully challenged
in this court in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC,
metrical regulation has the potential to tilt the
competitive playing field in favor of one class of
telecommunications carriers or service providers.
4
Over the years, incumbents and newcomers
alike have gamed the regulatory process to secure
a competitive advantage in terms of reduced regu-
lation or cost savings. With skillful maneuvering, a
largely unregulated venture can provide services
functionally equivalent to those offered by a sub-
stantially regulated carrier. Other strategies in-
volve securing a classification that exempts the op-
erator from more burdensome regulatory duties
or qualifies the operator to receive cost savings or
cost avoidance opportunities.
Currently, Internet Service Providers ("ISPs")
can qualify for "reciprocal" interconnection pay-
ments from local exchange carriers without hav-
ing to generate a return flow of traffic. 5 ISPs also
can offer Internet-mediated long distance tele-
765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985), where we struck down
"mandatory detariffing" as inconsistent with the 1934
Act.
MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760, 761-62 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (citations omitted).
3 Mark Schankerman, Symmetric Regulation for Competitive
Telecommunications, 8 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 3, 6 (1996) ("[A]II
forms of asymmetric regulation contain an intrinsic bias to-
ward some firms or technologies.").
4 See Prof. Dr. Gunter Knieps, Interconnection and Network
Access, 23 FORDHLAM INT'L LJ. 90, 99 (2000).
There is a wide range of possible asymmetric regulation.
Whereas, in the past, legal entry barriers protected mo-
nopolistic carriers, the regulatory pendulum now seems
to swing in the opposite direction. Asymmetric regula-
tion in favor of newcomers is motivated by the convic-
tion that, even after the abolishment of the legal monop-
oly, the incumbent carrier would still possess a factual
monopoly position on the network infrastructure and
the normal voice telephone service. Therefore, initial
support of newcomers, at least for a sufficient transition
period, has been recommended recently in the national
regulatory debates.
Id.
5 See Rebecca Beynon, The FCC's Implementation of the 1996
Act: Agency Litigation Strategies and Delay, 53 FED. COMM. L.J.
27, 39 (2000).
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phone services free of interconnection charges
without the duty to make universal service contri-
butions like that of competitors.6 Longer-standing
tactics include selecting a favorable jurisdiction
(federal rather than state), legal classification
(private carrier versus common carrier) 7 and cash
flow status (reseller instead of facilities-based car-
rier).
I. THE LAW OF UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES
The authors of the Telecommunications Act of
Each time a customer places a call to the ISP, the incum-
bent carrier winds up paying the competing carrier a
per-minute termination fee. Consider also the nature of
ISP traffic. First, such traffic is typically 'one way.' That
is, many customers call an ISP in order to connect to the
Internet, but an ISP seldom places calls to other custom-
ers. Second, calls made to ISPs are typically much longer
than the average voice call, since people often surf the
Internet for hours at a time. The potential for regulatory
arbitrage is obvious-a competing carrier that signs up
an ISP as a customer stands to collect far more in recip-
rocal compensation fees than it will pay out in connec-
tion with serving that customer.
Id.
6 See In re Federal State Joint Board on Universal Service,
Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11,501, 11,541-46, paras.
83-93 (1998) [hereinafter Report to Congress]; see also Robert
M. Frieden, Universal Service: When Technologies Converge and
Regulatory Models Diverge, 13 HARVARDJ.L. & Trnch. 395 (2000)
[hereinafter Frieden, Regulatory Models Diverge]; Jamie N.
Nafziger, Time To Pay Up: Internet Service Providers' Universal
Service Obligations Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 16
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 37 (1997); Dennis W.
Moore, Jr., Regulation of the Internet and Internet Telephony
Through the Imposition of Access Charges, 76 TEX. L. REV. 183
(1997); Hank lntven et al., Internet Telephony-the Regulatory
Issues, 21 HASTINC;S COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (1998); Seth A. Co-
hen, Deregulating, Defiagmenting & Interconnecting: Reconsider-
ing Commercial Telecommunications Regulation in Relation to the
Rise of Internet Telephony, 18J.L. & COM. 133 (1998); Henry E.
Crawford, Internet Calling: FCC.Jurisdiction Over Internet Teleph-
ony, 5 CoMMLAw CoNsPEcrus 43 (1997); Katherine Collins,
International Accounting Rate Reform: The Role of International
Organizations and Implications for Developing Countries, 31 LAw
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1077 (2000).
7 SeeJames H. Lister, The Rights of Common Carriers and the
Decision Whether to Be a Common Carrier or a Non-Regulated Com-
munications Provider, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 91 (2000).
8 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-170).
9 Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change
and Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress
and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. REVv. 976, 983 (1997) [hereinafter
Price & Duffy]. In the floor discussions of the new legislation,
it was commonplace to hear that a vision of "the convergence
of these technologies" lay at "the heart of this reform effort,"
[citing 142 CONG. Rv(:. H1161 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (state-
ment of Rep. Oxley)] that it was "about time for Congress to
19968 (the "'96 Act") had great expectations9 that
they could engineer competition and enhance
consumer welfare simply by rewriting a law to re-
move regulatory barriers to competition.10 Con-
gress assumed that it could craft legislation that
created complementary incentives to achieve this
goal. I For incumbent Bell Operating Companies
("BOCs"), the law links their access to long dis-
tance markets with affirmative steps to open their
networks to new local exchange service competi-
tors.1 2 The law also seeks to motivate competitive
local exchange carriers ("CLECs") to construct fa-
cilities, which will stimulate demand through
update the law to catch up with the new convergence in
video, computer and telephone technologies," [citing 141
CONG. REC. S8464 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Leahy)] and that the bill would "allow the cable, tele-
phone, computer, broadcasting, and other telecommunica-
tions industries more easily to converge and transform them-
selves." [citing 141 CONG. REc. S8477 (daily ed. June 15,
1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler)]. Digitalization, among
other things, had rendered modes of transmitting informa-
tion interchangeable; as a result, many in Congress believed
that historic divisions, artificially supported by legislative dis-
tinctions and federal and state bureaucratic arrangements,
needed to be dissolved. Id. See also Joint Explanatory State-
ment of the Committee of Conference, H.R. CONF. REP. No.
104-458, at H1078 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124.
11) Michael 1. Meyerson, Ideas of the Marketplace: A Guide to
the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 251
(1997). For background on the Telecommunications Act of
1996, see generally Robert M. Frieden, The Telecommunications
Act of 1996: Predicting the Winners and Losers, 20 I-HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 11 (1997); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REv. 123, 127
(1996); Michael Glover & Donna Epps, Is The Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 Working?, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1013 (2000);
John C. Roberts, The Sources of Statutory Meaning: An Archaeo-
logical Case Study of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 53 SMU L.
REV. 143 (2000) [hereinafter Roberts]; Aimee M. Adler, Com-
petition in Telephony: Perception or Reality? Current Barriers to The
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 7J.L. & POL'Y 571 (1999).
11 See Price & Duffy, supra note 9, at 982 ("There was a
headiness to the rhetoric, a sense that a legislative revolution
would assist, and perhaps even underwrite, a technological
and organizational revolution in which past media categories
would be swept away and a new era of national achievement
and citizen and consumer empowerment would be
achieved.").
12 47 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. IV 1998). This section contains
a fourteen-point checklist, among other requirements, which
BOCs must adhere to before being allowed into the in-
terLATA long distance telephone service markets. LATA is an
acronym for Local Access and Transport Area, a geographi-
cal region created in the AT&T divestiture case within which
the spun-off BOCs can provide local and toll services. 47
U.S.C. § 153(25) (A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1998). The 14-point com-
petitive checklist requires the BOCs to provide: 1) full and
fair interconnection with competitive local exchange carriers
in accordance with the requirements of §§ 251(c)(2) and
252(d)(1); 2) nondiscriminatory and "ala carte" access to
network elements in accordance with the requirements of
[Vol. 10
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lower prices and new options, rather than by
reselling the services of incumbent local exchange
carriers ("ILECs").13
Congress underestimated the ability of stake-
holders to thwart progress through litigation'
4
and to exploit ambiguous language in the '96 Act
to maintain or create an unlevel competitive play-
ing field.'5 Stakeholders have spent more time vy-
ing in the courts than competing in the market-
place.16 Likewise, stakeholders have devised
clever ways to exploit '96 Act provisions in ways
not contemplated by Congress, such as routing In-
ternet traffic through a CLEC, which is affiliated
with an ISP, to trigger '96 Act mandated compen-
sation, even though the CLEC has little or no off-
setting traffic for ILEC routing.'
7
Technological innovations and market conver-
gence in telecommunications require commensu-
§§ 251 (c) (3) and 252 (d) (1); 3) nondiscriminatory access to
the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way owned or con-
trolled by the Bell operating company at just and reasonable
rates in accordance with the requirements of § 224; 4) local
loop transmission from the central office to a customer's
premises, unbundled from local switching or other services;
5) local transport from the trunk side of a wireline local ex-
change carrier's switch unbundled from switching or other
services; 6) local switching unbundled from transport, local
loop transmission, or other services; 7) nondiscriminatory ac-
cess to 911 emergency services, directory assistance services
to allow the other carriers' customers to obtain telephone
numbers and operator call completion services; 8) white
pages directory listings for customers of other carriers' tele-
phone exchange services; 9) nondiscriminatory access to tele-
phone numbers for assignment to the other carriers' tele-
phone exchange service customers; nondiscriminatory access
to databases and associated signaling necessary for call rout-
ing and completion; 10) nondiscriminatory access to data-
bases and associated signaling necessary for call routing and
completion; 11) number portability, which is, the ability of a
former BOC customer to retain use of a preexisting tele-
phone number after having subscribed to telephone service
from another carrier; 12) nondiscriminatory access to such
services or information as are necessary to allow requesting
carriers to implement local dialing parity in accordance with
the requirements of § 251 (b) (3), which is the same number
of digits dialed for either BOC or alternative service; 13) re-
ciprocal compensation arrangements in accordance with the
requirements of § 252(d) (2), which is compensation from a
BOC to a CLEC when it completes a call and vice versa; and
14) telecommunications services are available for resale in ac-
cordance with the requirements of §§ 251(c)(4) and
252(d) (3). 47 U.S.C. § 271 (c) (2) (B).
13 Alexandra M. Wilson, Harmonizing Regulation by Promot-
ing Facilities-Based Competition, 8 GEO. MASON L. Rxv. 729, 730
(2000) ("Because the 1996 Act alone will not solve the regu-
latory convergence problem, the dilemma policymakers face
is how to change the current system to alleviate the detrimen-
tal effects of asymmetrical regulation, and how to avoid the
reflexive application of shopworn regulatory antecedents.").
14 Rebecca Beynon, The FCCs Implementation of the 1996
rate adjustments in the legal and regulatory
arena, particularly when ventures now can pro-
vide functionally equivalent services yet face dif-
ferent regulatory treatment. Legislative changes
to the status quo occur most infrequently,' 8 while
"regulatory lag"' 9 becomes a more common oc-
currence, as a significant period of time may run
before regulations reflect changed technological
and marketplace circumstances.20 During such
periods of delayed adjustment the regulatory pro-
cess may favor one competitor over others, partic-
ularly when marketplace conditions trigger new
competitive opportunities and technological con-
vergence eliminates barriers to market entry or
market segmentation. 2' Comparatively lighter reg-
ulation of market entrants may properly incubate
and promote incipient competition. But without
recalibration, a regulatory dichotomy may distort
Act: Agency Litigation Strategies and Delay, 53 FED. COMM. L.J.
27, 27-29 (2000).
15 See Kathleen Wallman, A Birthday Party: The Terrible or
Terrific Two's? 1996 Federal Telecommunications Act, 51 FED.
COMM. L.J. 229, 229-31 (1998).
16 Jube Shiver, Jr., Los Angles Times Interview; William Ken-
nard: On Regulating the Marketplace of the Telecommunications
Boom, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 1998, at M3. ("['T]oo many of the
stakeholders in this debate would rather litigate than com-
pete.'").
17 See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
18 Roberts, supra note 10, at 146 ("Congress repeatedly
ignored or rebuffed calls by the FCC and critics to amend
and update the 1934 Act to provide guidance on emerging
issues and technologies.").
19 Regulatory lag has been defined as "the general delay
in the responses of regulators to changes in cost or market
conditions." Robert W. Crandall & J. Gregory Sidak, Competi-
tion and Regulatory Policies for Interactive Broadband Networks, 68
S. CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1221 (1995).
20 James Alleman et al., Universal Service: The Poverty of Pol-
icy, 71 U. COLO. L. Rv. 849, 850 (2000) ("For the transition
to competition to succeed, asymmetric measures to control
market power should be phased out as the incumbent's mar-
ket power diminishes.").
21 For example, when separate companies installed sepa-
rate wires to provide mutually exclusive telephone and video
services, different legal and regulatory classifications applied
to telephone and cable television services, with the former
treated as common carriage and the latter as non-common
carriage.
[C] able systems have two relevant special characteristics.
They are unusually involved with government, for they
depend upon government permission and government
facilities (streets, rights-of-way) to string the cable neces-
sary for their services. And in respect to leased channels,
their speech interests are relatively weak because they
act less like editors, such as newspapers or television
broadcasters, than like common carriers, such as tele-
phone companies.
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727, 739 (1996).
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markets and handicap incumbents who deserve
similar deregulation or streamlined government
oversight.
"2
The authors of the '96 Act thought they had
performed such a rebalancing of the telecommu-
nications regulatory regime so that more robust
competition might ensue without unduly favoring
entrants with preferential treatment or allowing
incumbents to exploit market power and engage
in anticompetitive practices. To the apparent dis-
may of Congress, telecommunication and infor-
mation service providers have proven to be quite
adept at exploiting opportunities to capture
greater profits and market share by tilting the
competitive playing field to their advantage.
While designed to achieve market access parity,
the '96 Act, like so many laws and regulations
before it, has become a vehicle for clever interpre-
tation, exploitation and litigation. 23
For example, Congress thought that it could
ensure market access parity through a "one-size-
fits-all" regulatory classification, such as common
22 Some critics of FCC policies requiring ILECs to share
local distribution facilities allege:
[such] unbundling would be a classic case of asymmetric
regulation: the CLEC would pursue the more profitable,
unregulated service, while the ILEC would be left pro-
viding basic local service (in many cases, below cost). In-
novation would be eroded by regulations that arbitrarily
favored CLECs, without regard to the adverse effect of
such asymmetric regulation on the welfare of consum-
ers.
Thomas M. Jorde et al., Innovation, Investment, and Un-
bundling, 17 YALE J. ON REC.. 1, 32-33 (2000).
23 See Stanley M. Gorinson, Deregulation in Telecommunica-
tions: Competition or Confusion? 47 FED. LAw. 24, 26-27 (2000).
24 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (Supp. IV 1998) (deeming every
telecommunications carrier a "common carrier under this
Act only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecom-
munications services").
25 The FCC may forbear from applying any regulation or
any provision of the Communications Act if (1) "enforce-
ment of such regulation or provision is not necessary to en-
sure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regula-
tions . . .are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or
unreasonably discriminatory," (2) enforcement is not neces-
sary to protect consumers and (3) forbearance is consistent
with the public interest. 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. V
1999).
26 In MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1195-96
(D.C. Cir. 1985), the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia struck down "mandatory detariffing" as inconsis-
tent with the Communications Act of 1934; see also AT&T Co.
v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727, 735-36 (D.C. Cir. 1992), affd sub nom.
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994)
(noting the FCC could not suspend (permissively or
mandatorily) the tariff filing obligations for interexchange
carriers, whether they had market power or not); MCI
WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760, 766 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
carriage status for all types of commercial service
providers. 24 However, Congress also authorized
the FCC to eliminate aspects of traditional com-
mon carrier responsibilities, if the public interest
supported it.25 The new legislative mandate to
undo common carrier responsibilities, like filing
and complying with tariffs, 26 combine with previ-
ous FCC efforts selectively to streamline regula-
tions if not deregulate entirely.27 Collectively,
these apparently pro-competitive initiatives ex-
panded the dichotomy between the nature and
scope of regulation applied to dominant, incum-
bent carriers vfs-a-vfs market entrants and other
carriers that may qualify for streamlined regula-
tion. These initiatives blur the distinction between
traditionally regulated common carriers and their
unregulated private carrier counterparts.
28
Some telecommunications ventures have
avoided costly regulatory burdens simply on
grounds that they lack market power, 29 or be-
cause they have semantically crafted services so
that they qualify for little or no regulatory over-
(holding that mandatory detariffing for interexchange carri-
ers was reasonable).
27 In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competi-
tive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorization
Therefor, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 77
F.C.C.2d 308, 309-10, paras. 2, 8, 10 (1979); In re Rates for
Competitive Common Carrier Services, First Report and Order,
85 F.C.C.2d 1, 2, 4, paras. 2, 4, 6 (1980), Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (1981), Second Report
and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982), reconsideration denied, 93
F.C.C.2d 54 (1983), Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,308 (Apr. 22, 1982), Third Report and Or-
der, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791 (Oct. 14, 1983), Fourth Report and
Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554 (1983), Fourth Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,856 (Mar. 28, 1984), Fifth Report
and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191 (1984), Sixth Report and Order, 99
F.C.C.2d 1020 (1985), rev'd and remanded sub nom. MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re
Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace,
Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880, 5881, para. 2 (1991), on
reconsideration, 7 FCC Rcd. 2677 (1992), on further reconsidera-
tion, 8 FCC Rcd. 2659 (1993), Second Report and Order, 8 FCC
Rcd. 3668 (1993), on further reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd. 4562
(1995) (reducing scope of AT&T's dominant carrier status
and allowing provision of service based on customized tariffs
preceded by a contract for carriage), further reconsideration de-
nied, 10 FCC Rcd. 4421 (1995).
28 See Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common Car-
riage Survive the Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 955, 956, 967 (1997).
29 The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics defines
market power as the "ability of a single, or group of buyer(s)
or seller(s) to influence the price of the product or service in
which it is trading. A perfectly competitive market in equilib-
rium ensures the complete absence of market power." THE
MIT DICIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMIcs 268 (David W.
Pearce ed., MIT Press 1995).
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sight. On the other hand, some incumbents have
continued to incur such burdens despite changed
circumstances and the '96 Act requirement that
all service providers, regardless of regulatory clas-
sification, should bear on a "competitively neu-
tral" basis the obligation of making financial con-
tributions to support universal access to basic
telecommunications. 30 For example, ISPs and
other ventures providing enhancements to leased
lines do not pay local exchange carrier access
charges or contribute to universal service funding
even when other carriers would trigger such pay-
ments.3
1
Both newcomers and subsidiaries of incum-
bents may secure regulatory exemptions on se-
mantic grounds by characterizing and offering
services in a way that qualifies for diminished reg-
ulation. Incumbents may exploit regulatory iner-
tia that maintains regulatory safeguards and barri-
ers to market entry based on persisting concepts
of "natural monopoly" and a strained view that
only one enterprise can achieve public policy
objectives such as effectively executing a universal
service mission. Alternatively, incumbent carriers
may create separate subsidiaries to qualify for un-
regulated or lightly regulated non-dominant, mar-
ket entrant status.
3 2
Regulatory arbitrage refers to the ability of
stakeholders to exploit differences in legislative
and regulatory classifications with an eye toward
securing more favorable or less burdensome regu-
latory treatment that typically will accrue financial
and competitive advantages."' This article will ex-
amine a number of semantically driven regulatory
dichotomies (common carrier versus private car-
rier, basic versus enhanced services and ILEC ver-
sus CLEC) with an eye toward determining
whether technological convergence and regula-
30 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (Stipp. IV 1998) ("Every telecom-
munications carrier that provides interstate telecommunica-
tions services shall contribute, on an equitable and nondis-
criminatory basis, to the specific, predictable, and sufficient
mechanisms established by the Commission to preserve and
advance universal service."); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2) (A) (re-
quiring the FCC to "establish competitively neutral rules-
(A) to enhance, to the extent technically feasible and eco-
nomically reasonable, access to advanced telecommunica-
tions and information services for all public and nonprofit
elementary and secondary school classrooms, health care
providers, and libraries"); Texas Office of Public Utility
Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed
sub nom. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 531 U.S. 975 (2000).
31 Frieden, Regulatory Models Diverge, supra note 6, at
412-13.
tory opportunism defeat the possibility of estab-
lishing a dual track regulatory regime. Addition-
ally, the article scrutinizes marketplace anomalies
created by international accounting rate arbitrage
and Internet telephony. The availability of these
services results, in part, from a regulatory dichot-
omy that triggers a diversion or inflow of funds
based on an operator's regulatory classification
and its adeptness at exploiting arbitrage opportu-
nities. The article concludes with suggestions on
how legislators and regulators might curb regula-
tory opportunism by abandoning the strategy of
classifying carriers based on static technological
or market share assumptions.
II. REGULATORY ARBITRAGE
Regulation invites clever and strategic thinking
about ways to exploit loopholes to secure a com-
petitive or financial windfall. Evading a regulatory
burden can translate into cost savings and greater
nimbleness in a competitive environment. Some-
times avoiding a regulatory requirement means
that the stakeholder can save money or even qual-
ify for an unexpected flow of revenues. The arbi-
trage aspect of this brinkmanship involves the
strategic targeting and qualifying to receive lax or
favorable regulatory treatment while, at the same
time, retaining the ability to offer functionally
equivalent services that compete with offerings of
other stakeholders subject to more burdensome,
costly and unfavorable regulatory treatment.
The FCC does not wish to tilt the competitive
playing field in favor of one class of player vis-a-vfs
others, yet many of its regulatory decisions have
that result. Often the Commission may purport
not to favor any class of operator, but the nature
of the burdens placed on incumbents or the re-
32 As part of its initial deregulatory thrust in the 1980s,
the FCC developed a regulatory dichotomy between domi-
nant carriers to be subject to conventional but possibly
streamlined regulation, and nondominant carriers to be sub-
ject to regulatory forbearance based on the view that carriers
lacking market power should not be burdened with regula-
tions designed to curb the potential for dominant carriers to
engage in anticompetitive practices. See Scott M. Schoenwald,
Regulating Competition in the Interexchange Telecommunications
Market: The Dominant/Nondominant Carrier Approach and the
Evolution of Forbearance, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 367, 375-76
(1997).
33 A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regula-
tory Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATrION POLICY
AND THiF GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTrURE 129 (Brian
Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997).
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fusal to unburden them relative to market en-
trants invariably favors the latter group.
Over the years a number of such regulatory
anomalies and asymmetries have occurred. For
example, the price, but not necessarily the cost, of
a minute of telecommunication use has depended
on such factors as:
* the perceived value of the service; 34
34 Both the FCC and state regulatory commissions have
allowed carriers to price some services on the perceived value
consumers accrue. For example, some local exchange tele-
phone service rates have increased when the number of ac-
cessible subscribers reaches a benchmark.
In most states, the Bell Operating Companies and larger
independents charge higher rates in metropolitan areas
than in rural areas-a pricing practice that dates back to
the turn of the century and is traditionally justified in
the belief that the value of the service provided is higher
for subscribers with larger local calling areas. Press Re-
lease, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Re-
leases Semiannual Study on Telephone Trends (Aug. 7,
1991), available at 1991 FCC LEXIS 4305 at *10.
35 Typically an intrastate long distance minute of use sig-
nificantly exceeds the price of an interstate long distance
minute of use. Ironically, an intrastate state call originated
via a cellular telephone may be significantly cheaper than the
corresponding rate for a call originated over wireline facili-
ties. The rate differential results, in part, from rate-making
policies, which historically have included cross-subsidies to
local exchange service, as opposed to actual cost of service
differences. Additionally, many cellular service packages of-
fer minutes of use without regard to whether they are local or
long distance. See California v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505, 1507 (9th
Cir. 1993). ("We recognize the states' concern that, because
the states' rates for intrastate services offset other costs, state
rates will be higher than federal tariffs, and customers may
attempt to use the federal tariff for intrastate as well as inter-
state communications.").
36 International message telephone service substantially
exceeds domestic rates on a per-minute and mileage-band
basis, primarily because international carriers have negoti-
ated toll revenue division agreements that have failed to drop
commensurately with cost reductions. See Rob Frieden, Inter-
national Toll Revenue Division: Tackling the Inequities and Ineffi-
ciencies, 17 TELECOMM. POL'V 221, 221-33 (1993) [hereinafter
Freiden, International Toll Revenue]; Robert Frieden, Account-
ing Rates, The Business of International Telecommunications and
the Incentive to Cheat, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 111, 111-39 (1991)
[hereinafter Frieden, The Incentive to Cheat].
37 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and pre-existing
FCC regulations differentiate the terms and conditions for
interconnection between carriers as opposed to customer-
carrier interconnection. The Telecommunications Act or-
ders favorable and potentially zero-cost interconnection be-
tween certain types of carriers. For example, § 251 requires
all local exchange carriers "to establish reciprocal compensa-
tion arrangements for the transport and termination of tele-
communications." 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1998).
End-users and interexchange ("long distance") carriers must
pay higher "access charges." In re Developing a Unified Inter-
carrier Compensation Regime, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
CC Dkt. No. 01-92, FCC 01-132, paras. 5-10 (rel. Apr. 27,
2001).
* which regulatory agency has jurisdiction
over cost allocation and tariffing;
35
* whether the service is domestic or interna-
tional;3
6
* whether another carrier or end-user seeks
facilities interconnection;
37
* the type of carrier3 or enterprise39 provid-
ing service; 40 and
38 During a time when interexchange carrier competi-
tors of AT&T received inferior access to the public switched
telephone network, the Commission authorized discounted
access charges. However, the Commission never stated that
the discounts were cost-based as opposed to a rough justice
solution designed to reflect both inferior access and the
Commission's desire that carriers like MCI acquire market
share. See generally In re Exchange Network Facilities for Inter-
state Access ("ENFIA"), Report and Order, 71 F.C.C.2d 440,
(1979), on reconsideration, 93 F.C.C.2d 739 (1983), affd in part
and remanded in part sub nona. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC,
712 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Currently, the FCC is consid-
ering whether wireless mobile service providers like cellular
radio operators should have to compensate wireline local ex-
change carriers for terminating calls while such wireline car-
riers do not have to compensate the wireless operators for
similar call terminations. See In re Interconnection Between
Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Ser-
vice Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd.
5020, 5039, para. 39 (1996) (proposing reciprocal termina-
tion between wireline and wireless carriers, including the
possibility of an interim zero termination charge between
carriers); In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Intercon-
nection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial
Mobile Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order, II FCC
Rcd. 15,499 (1996), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom.
Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir.
1997), aff d in part and vacated in part sub nom. Iowa Utils. Bd.
v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), affd in part, rev'd in part,
and remanded sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S.
366 (1999), Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC Rcd. 13,042
(1996), Second Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC Rcd. 19,738
(1996), Third Order on Reconsideration and Further Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 12 FCC Rcd. 12,460 (1997), appeals docketed,
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd. 8694
(1999).
39 "Captive" long distance callers from hotel rooms and
callers not familiar with "dial around" options for avoiding
price gouging for pay phone service recognize the vast price
differences for long distance telephone service.
41 Certain types of services have qualified for exemption
from regulatory burdens that impose extra costs. For exam-
ple, enhanced services qualify for non-common carrier status
and its users are exempt from having to pay an access charge
payment otherwise applicable to basic service subscribers. A
1987 FCC initiative to eliminate the exemption generated
substantial opposition by users who claimed the Commission
had proposed to impose a "modem tax."
In 1983 we adopted a comprehensive 'access charge'
plan for the recovery by local exchange carriers (LECs)
of the costs associated with the origination and termina-
tion of interstate calls. At that time, we concluded that
the immediate application of this plan to certain provid-
ers of interstate services might unduly burden their op-
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0 the type of line or facility providing service 4 1
and whether the service can access the pub-
lic switched telephone network ("PSTN").
42
III. JURISDICTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP
A perennial candidate for regulatory arbitrage
lies in securing favorable jurisdictional treatment.
On a cost causation basis, traversing a state or in-
ternational boundary should not make much dif-
ference. But how regulators and carriers allocate
costs and which services they attribute cost causa-
tion can result in substantially different cost levels
depending on whether telecommunications traf-
fic stays within a state, crosses state borders or
erations and cause disruptions in provision of service to
the public. Therefore, we granted temporary exemp-
tions from payment of access charges to certain classes
of exchange access users, including enhanced service
providers.
In re Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Re-
lating to Enhanced Service Providers, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 2 FCC Rcd. 4305, para. 1 (1987) (citing In re
MTS and WATS Market Structure, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 682 (1983)), terminated by Order, 3 FCC
Rcd. 2631 (1988) (abandoning proposal on grounds that de-
spite the apparent discrimination in charges "the current
state of change and uncertainty" besetting the enhanced ser-
vices industry justified ongoing exemption from access
charge payments) (proposing to imposed access charges on
enhanced service lines). Currently the FCC requires users of
ISDN services to pay only one Subscriber Line Charge, an
access payment, despite the fact that ISDN circuits can derive
more than one voice-grade equivalent channel.
41 The FCC's access charge regime established a differ-
ent pricing structure for switched and special access. The for-
mer includes regular dial up services and requires end-users
to pay a monthly flat-rated Subscriber Line Charge, currently
$3.50 for residential and small business users and $6.00 for
other business users. The latter includes leased, private line
users, who certify that the line does not "leak" into the PSTN
through the use, for example, of an on-premises switch, like a
Private Branch Exchange, that could couple the private line
with trunks that access the PSTN provided by local exchange
carriers ostensibly for local switched services. See In re MTS/
WATS Market Structure (Phase I), Third Report and Order, 93
F.C.C.2d 241, (1983), modified on reconsideration, 97 F.C.C.2d
682, further modification an reconsideration, 97 F.C.C.2d 834, par-
tially affd and partially remanded sub nom. NARUC v. FCC, 737
F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984), further modification, 99 F.C.C.2d
708 (1984); 100 F.C.C.2d 1222, further reconsideration denied,
102 F.C.C.2d 899 (1985); see also In re Investigation of Access
and Divestiture Related Tariffs, 101 F.C.C.2d 911 (1985), re-
consideration denied, In re Investigation of Access and Divesture
Related Tariffs Petition for Reconsideration and Clarification
of Allocations Plan Orders, 102 F.C.C.2d 503 (1985); In re
Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related Tariffs, 101
F.C.C.2d 935 (1985); 47 C.F.R. § 69.104(d) (1), (e) (2000).
42 International private line services, which do not access
the PSTN, are exempt from the accounting rate regime.
Their per minute costs are significantly lower than switched
leaves a nation. Intrastate traffic in the United
States and elsewhere typically triggers higher re-
tail rates than interstate traffic, even for routes of
equal distance.4 3 Similarly, international traffic
may cost several times as much as domestic rates
of equal mileage.
44
Given a significant gap between services, as a
function of jurisdictional classification, arbitrage
opportunities abound. Entrepreneurs have en-
gaged in creative traffic routing to shoehorn ser-
vices into a preferred jurisdiction. Traffic that
originates and terminates within a single state nev-
ertheless may traverse an adjacent state simply to
avoid intrastate ratemaking and the jurisdiction of
that state's public utility commission. 45 Until Ca-
services. Undetected private line leakage has become com-
monplace making it possible for resellers to provide a service
functionally equivalent to international message telephone
service at a fraction of the cost. See Rob Frieden, The Impact of
Boomerang Boxes and Callback Services on the Accounting Rate Re-
gime, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE PACIFIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COUNCIL EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 781-90 (D.
Wedemeyer & R. Nickelson, eds., 1996).
43 For example, AT&T's One Rate 7¢ Plan and MCI
WorldCom's 70 Plan charge 7¢ per minute on state-to-state
calls but charge from 7¢ to 14¢ on in-state calls depending
on the state. See AT&T, at http://www.att.com (last visited
Apr. 1, 2001); MCI WorldCom, at http://mci.worldcom.com
(last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
44 The FCC analyzed international long distance tele-
phone pricing information in its report, COMMON CARRIER
BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, TRENDS IN
TELEPHONE SERVICE, at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/trend200.
pdf (Dec. 21, 2000).
45 The FCC and reviewing courts have rejected a "con-
tamination theory" that if applied would subject a telecom-
munications service to intrastate jurisdiction if any portion of
the service was offered solely within one state: "The 'contami-
nation theory' contemplates that a service or facility used
only partially for intrastate communication is not subject to
Commission jurisdiction." In re United States Dept. of Def. v.
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Northwest, 38 F.C.C.2d 803, 808, para. 8
n.17 (1973). But cf. In re Petition of the New York Telephone
Company for a Declaratory Ruling with Respect to the Physi-
cally Intrastate Private Line and Special Access Channels Uti-
lized for Sales Agents to Computer New York State Lottery
Communications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 5 FCC
Rcd. 1080, 1080-81, paras. 1-2 (1990) (concluding that the
addition of two physically interstate private lines to a lottery
network that is otherwise comprised of physically intrastate
lines does not require the local exchange carrier providing
the service to classify all of the lottery's special access lines as
interstate); see also In re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 2 FCC Rcd.
3528, (1985), denied by Memorandum Opinion and Order on Re-
consideration, 2 FCC Rcd. 3528 (1987); In re MTS and WATS
Market Structure, Amendment of Part 36 of the Commis-
sion's Rules and Establishment of ajoint Board, Decision and
Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 5660, 5661, para. 8 (1989) (establishing
definitive jurisdictional policy on lines having mixed intra-
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nadian long distance telephone rates dropped to
U.S. levels, carriers would transmit traffic via the
U.S. and back into Canada to qualify the traffic
for lower Canada-U.S rates than the higher do-
mestic charges. Similarly, call-back operators
would import dial tone from nations with low in-
ternational calling rates even for domestic calls.
46
Arbitrageurs find and exploit price margins
whether created by regulation (intrastate versus
interstate rates) or different competitive condi-
tions (high international calling versus lower call-
ing rates).
47
IV. SEMANTIC GAMES: PRIVATE VERSUS
COMMON CARRIERS
Regulatory avoidance and arbitrage also occurs
state and interstate use).
411 See Robert M. Frieden, The Impact of Call-Back and Arbi-
trage on the Accounting Rate Regime, 21 TELECOMM. POLY
819-27 (1997) [hereinafter Frieden, Impact of Call-Back].
47 Market Entry And Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated En-
tities, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 3873, 3927, 3931, paras.
142, 152 (1995) ("The development of private line resale is a
form of arbitrage that will create additional competition,
leading to lower accounting rates.").
48 See generally Rob M. Frieden, Schizophrenia Among Carri-
ers: How Common Carriers and Private Carriers Trade Places, 3
MicHi. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 19 (1997).
49 See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros., 256 U.S.
566, 572 (1921) (holding exculpatory clauses in common
carrier tariff limited liability to refunding cost of carriage de-
spite substantial financial damage resulting from non-deliv-
ery of a message transmitted only once). See generally Christy
Cornell Kunin, Unilateral Taiff Exculpation in the Era of Com-
petitive Telecommunications, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 907 (1992)
(examining exculpation of common carrier liability).
50 See, e.g., In re Bell System Tariff Offerings, Decision, 46
F.C.C.2d 413, 422, para. 15 (1974), affirmed sub nom. Bell Tel.
Co. of Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(mandating access to local exchange facilities); In re Estab-
lishment of Domestic Communications Satellite Facilities, Re-
port and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 86, 97, paras. 27-28 (1970), policy
reaffirmed by Proposed Second Report and Order, 34 F.C.C.2d 9,
64-65, paras. 134-35 (1972), adopted by Second Report and Or-
der, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, (1972), on reconsideration, 38 F.C.C.2d
665 (1972) (domestic satellite policy mandates nondiscrimi-
natory, diverse, and flexible access to domestic satellites and
earth station facilities); accord In re Specialized Common Car-
rier Services, First Report and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 940, pa-
ras. 157-58 (1971) (requiring AT&T to allow local exchange
facility access to competing inter-city carriers), reconsideration
denied, 35 F.C.C.2d 1106 (1971), affirmed sub nom. Washington
Util. and Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975); In re Use of the
Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., Decision, 13
F.C.C.2d 420 (1968), reconsideration denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571
(1968) (invalidating local exchange carrier tariff restrictions
on interconnection of customer premises equipment with
when ventures seek preferred legal classifications.
While private carriers used to lack opportunities
to target and serve third parties like their com-
mon carrier counterparts, over time, the FCC per-
mitted such marketing, thereby diminishing the
difference between private and common car-
riage.
48
The rights and responsibilities historically
vested in common carriers tempered their market
power in exchange for reduced liability or insula-
tion from commercial and personal damages
caused by the content carried. 49 Historically, prov-
iders of neutral and transparent conduits did not
have to monitor the content carried, nor could
they typically refuse access5" to their bottleneck
5'
the telephone network); In re Telerent Leasing Corp., Deci-
sion, 45 F.C.C.2d 204 (1974), aff'd sub nom. North Carolina
Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976). See generally In re Proposals For
New or Revised Classes Of Interstate and Foreign Message
Toll Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone
Service (WATS), 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975), Second Report and
Order, 58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976), affd sub nom. North Carolina
Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977) (pre-
empting the states on the matter of customer premises equip-
ment interconnection with the telephone network).
51 In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competi-
tive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations
Therefor, First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 21-22, paras.
58-59 (1980).
A firm controlling bottleneck facilities has the ability to
impede access of its competitors to those facilities. We
must be in a position to contend with this type of poten-
tial abuse. We treat control of bottleneck facilities as
prima facie evidence of market power requiring detailed
regulatory scrutiny. Control of bottleneck facilities is
present when a firm or group of firms has sufficient
command over some essential commodity or facility in
its industry or trade to be able to impede new entrants.
Thus bottleneck control describes the structural charac-
teristic of a market that new entrants must either be al-
lowed to share the bottleneck facility or fail.
Id.
See also United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383
(1912) (ordering railroads to provide competitors equivalent
access to bottleneck railway terminal facilities), appeal after re-
mand, 236 U.S. 194 (1915); In reAn Inquiry Into the Use of
the Bands 825-845 Mhz and 870-890 Mhz for Cellular Com-
munications Systems; and Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of
the Commission's Rules Relative to Cellular Communications
Systems, Report and Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 495-96, paras.
54-55 (1981) (requiring telephone companies to furnish in-
terconnection to cellular systems upon terms no less
favorable than those used by or offered to wireline carriers),
modified, 89 F.C.C.2d 58 (1982), further modified, 90 F.C.C.2d
571 (1982); In re Need to Promote Competition and Efficient
Use of Spectrum for Radio Common Carrier Services, Declar-
atory Ruling, 2 FCC Rcd. 2910 (1987), clarified, Order, 2 FCC
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facilities on the basis of content.5 2 ISPs and mo-
bile radio operators serving retail customers oper-
ate like common carriers, at least insofar as their
carriage of voice telephony traffic and generated
by such third parties. In the former case, Internet-
mediated telephony does not constitute common
carriage. However, in the latter case Congress
closed a semantic loophole by deeming all com-
mercial mobile radio services, even if initially clas-
sified as private carriage, to be common car-
riage. 53 Subsequent streamlining of common
carrier regulation applied equally and fairly to
both types of common carriers-incumbents and
those classified as private carriers.
54
The common carrier insulation from liability
would support the development of a ubiquitous
ISP infrastructure and, in turn, promote universal
access to information services. 55 Historically, com-
mon carriage has applied exclusively to public
utilities and other providers of essential services.
Policy makers have not yet deemed Internet ac-
cess so essential as to place it in the same category
as Plain Old Telephone Service ("POTS") as op-
posed to other desirable, non-common carrier
services like cable television.5 6 Additionally, re-
cent developments in the interpretation of what
Rcd. 4370 (1987), affd on reconsideration, Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order on Reconsideration, 4 FCC Rcd. 2369 (1989); Lin-
coln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092, 1103-06 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (upholding Commission's order requiring Lin-
coln Telephone to provide interconnection facilities to
MCI); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir.
1974).
52 In Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989), the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute prohibit-
ing obscene telephone messages, but overturned the statute's
absolute denial of adult access via telecommunication com-
mon carriers to indecent messages that are entitled to First
Amendment protection.
53 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (Aug. 10, 1993) amending the
Communications Act of 1934 to revise, along with other sec-
tions, § 332 to authorize the FCC to establish regulatory par-
ity among private and common carrier mobile telecommuni-
cation services. The revised § 332 of the Communications Act
defines "commercial mobile service" as "any mobile service
(as defined in section 3(n)) that is provided for profit and
makes interconnected service available (A) to the public or
(B) to such classes of eligible users as to be effectively availa-
ble to a substantial portion of the public, as specified by regu-
lation by the Commission." 47 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1) (Supp. IV
1998); see also E. Ashton Johnston, Regulatory Treatment of Mo-
bile Services: The FCC Attempts to Create Regulatory Symmetry, 2
CoMMLAWAT CONSPECTUS 1, 1 (1994).
54 See generally In re Access Charge Reform, Fifth Report
and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 14,221, (1999), affd sub nom.
WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.3d 449 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
constitutes common carriage does not support ex-
tending the classification to ISPs or using it as a
vehicle to bolster public policy support for univer-
sal Internet service.
The dichotomy between common carriers and
private carriers has grown murky, because of:




" A growing body of cases articulating robust
speaker rights of common carriers; 58 and
* Court cases imposing quasi-common carrier
obligations on private carriers59 and quasi-
publisher duties on common carriers.:0
Extension of the common carrier model ap-
pears difficult now that common carriers can
avoid many of the traditional requirements and
non-common carriers have acquired some of the
insulation from liability previously available only
to common carriers. The '96 Act requires the ap-
plication of common carriage classification on
commercial providers of telecommunication ser-
vices, 6 1 but authorizes the FCC to abandon virtu-
ally all regulatory requirements on any common
carrier if circumstances favor such deregulation.
62
On the other hand, the '96 Act provides ISPs with
55 See Frieden, Regulatory Models Diverge, supra note 6, at
404-05.
56 In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 (1979),
the Supreme Court struck down FCC rules requiring cable
television operators to set aside channel capacity for public,
educational and government use on grounds that cable tele-
vision does not constitute common carriage.
57 See Rob Frieden, Contamination of the Common Carrier
Concept in Telecommunications, 19 TELECOMM. POL'Y 685
(1995).
58 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571-72 (1980) (striking a restriction
on public utility advertising).
59 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622
(1994) (requiring cable television operators to carry broad-
cast television signals).
60 See id. at 650 (imposing a duty to inquire and disclose
whether content is obscene or indecent).
61 Section 153(44) defines telecommunications carrier
"as a common carrier ... to the extent that it is engaged in
providing telecommunications services." 47 U.S.C. § 153(44)
(Supp. IV 1998). Section 332 also requires the FCC to treat as
common carriage the provision of commercial mobile ser-
vices. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
62 Section 160(a) of the revised Communications Act or-
ders the FCC to "forbear from applying any regulation or any
provision of... [the Communications Act] to a telecommu-
nications carrier or telecommunication service" if such regu-
lation is no longer necessary to ensure just, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory rates, to safeguard consumers and that
such forbearance would serve the public interest. 47 U.S.C.
§ 160(a) (Supp. 1V 1998).
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a quasi-common carrier exemption from liability
for the carriage of material, like obscenity and
copyright violations, if the operator had no knowl-
edge that it carried the offending content.6
V. THE GAME CONTINUES
Jurisdictional brinkmanship continues despite
the reforms engineered by the '96 Act. ISPs have
created CLEC affiliates with the sole purpose of
qualifying for a compensation stream based on
the jurisdictional view that the link from Internet
subscriber to the ILEC and then onward to the
ISP's CLEC affiliate and finally to the ISP is a local
and not an interstate call.
64
The '96 Act requires reciprocal compensation
between ILECs and CLECs based on the view that
such a compulsory compensation scheme would
encourage market entry and competition in the
local exchange services.6 5 Reciprocal compensa-
tion presumably would favor incumbents who
would receive more traffic generated by a CLEC.
ILECs sought this transfer payment system in lieu
of a rough justice "sender keep all," "bill and
keep" model,66 because of the expected asymme-
try in traffic flows, in which small market entrants
with few customers typically would hand off more
traffic for termination by the incumbent to one of
its subscribers than would the incumbent hand off
traffic for termination by a CLEC to one of its cus-
tomers.67
ISPs and their CLEC affiliates outsmarted the
ILECs by engineering a local exchange routing
system that guaranteed the CLEC significant traf-
fic originating on ILEC facilities and requiring a
transfer to CLEC facilities, but without the pros-
63 Historically, common carriers have operated as neu-
tral and transparent conduits, neither knowledgeable of the
content they carry, nor legally responsible for what they
carry. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 also provides le-
gal protection for the "[G]ood [S]amaritan" blocking and
screening of offensive material defined as "any action volun-
tarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or other-
wise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitu-
tionally protected." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
64 See Richard E. Wiley, Communications Law and the Three
C's-Competition, Convergence and Consolidation-Continue, 630
PLI/PATr 9, 77 (2000).
65 Id.
66 "Sender Keep All" and "Bill and Keep" arrangements
refer to the absence of a monetary transfer when carriers
agree to route the traffic of another carrier to yet another
carrier (also known as transiting), or to the final recipient.
pect for an off-setting return flow. Internet traffic
originated by an ILEC customer and handed off
to an ISP's CLEC affiliate qualifies for compensa-
tion from the ILEC because the traffic is deemed
local in nature. The FCC recently sought to close
the jurisdictional loophole by recognizing that
the end-to-end nature of the Internet-access call
typically delivers the call to an interstate and even
global network; however, the Commission re-
frained from upsetting in-place interconnection
arrangements and from preempting state public
utility commission jurisdiction over such arrange-
ments. Therefore, Internet access calls trigger the
reciprocal compensation requirement even
though an examination of the origination and ter-
mination "end points" of typical Internet calls
proves the interstate nature of most calls. Ironi-
cally, in previous instances, the FCC considered
the presence of even a small portion of interstate
calls as "contaminating" an otherwise intrastate
line and subjecting that line to federal and not
state jurisdiction.
68
VI. INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING RATE
ARBITRAGE
Because international accounting rates69 re-
main at artificially high levels for many routes,
carriers and their customers strategize on how to
route traffic exempt from the settlement process.
The vehicles for avoiding high accounting rates
include the use of call-back services, which pro-
vide dialtone to end-users physically situated in
another country, and linking international private
lines with a switch that secures access to the
PSTN. These options may violate ITU recommen-
These terms also refer to a business relationship: "Each car-
rier sets consumer collection rates and keeps 100%. This al-
lows new entrants, but it does not encourage operators to re-
ceive calls because no compensation is given to allow
incoming calls over their system." Taunya L. McLarty, Liberal-
ized Telecommunications Trade in the WTO: Implications for Uni-
versal Service Policy, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 41 n.203 (1998).
"7 Id. at 40-41 nn.201-03.
68 Id. at 4.
69 For background on how international telecommunica-
tions carriers divide toll revenues using the accounting rate
regime, see generally Robert M. Frieden, Falling Through the
Cracks: International Accounting Rate Reform at the ITU and
WI'O, 22 TELECOMM. PoL' 963 (1998) [hereinafter Frieden,
Falling Through the Cracks]; Frieden, Impact of Call-Back, supra
note 46; Frieden, International Toll Revenue, supra note 37;
Paul W. Kenefick, A Step in the Right Direction: The FCC Provides
Regulatory Relief in International Settlements and International Ser-
vices Licensing, 8 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 43, 54 (2000).
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dations70 and carrier tariffs because they enable
end-users to secure services in a manner that the
carrier did not intend on providing. While such
bypass may expedite reforms, it flouts uniform
rules of the road. For example, the ITU Recom-
mendations on leased international private lines
contemplate the consultation and agreement on
the scope of service. 71 Private lines, by definition,
provide closed, intra-corporate networking capa-
bilities, which are not functionally equivalent to
switched public, long distance services.
What is occurring in international telecommu-
nications parallels the grey market in interna-
tional commercial aviation where carriers look
the other way, or clandestinely collaborate with
ticket resellers, consolidators and brokers who of-
fer seats at rates well below the published tariff.
72
In international telecommunications, sophisti-
cated users and system integrators design private
line networks that avoid accounting rates liabil-
ity.73 Carriers originally offered unmetered pri-
vate lines as a way to fill up excess capacity and
satisfy large-volume user requirements for closed,
internal networks.7 4 Private branch exchanges
and other customer-controlled equipment have
enabled users to interconnect unmetered interna-
tional private lines with local public switched tele-
phone networks.75 Such "leakiness" enables the
private line subscriber to access users outside the
internal network. Expanded access to a private
70 Recommendation D.1, Sec. 7.1.1 of the ITU's Interna-
tional Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee
Blue Book, Vol. 11, Fascicle 11.1, General Tariff Principles,
Charging and Accounting in International Telecommunica-
tions Services (1991). The Recommendation suggested that
administrations can condition, consult and agree to the
scope of access to public networks provided to users of inter-
national private leased circuits. To the extent that a private
line reseller or end user does not engage in such consulta-
tion and erects a system for accounting rate evasion, then the
host country may deny access to the PSTN. However, in many
instances accounting rate avoidance schemes may go unde-
tected by the carrier providing interconnection.
71 See International Telecommunication Union, Tele-
communications Standardization Sector, General principles
for the lease of international (continental and intercontinen-
tal) private telecommunication circuits and networks, D Se-
ries: General tariff principles (1991).
72 International carriers do provide discounted rates to
high volume users. For example, international carries would
offer a discount as an incentive to migrate from unmetered
private lines to metered "virtual" (software defined) private
lines tsing the public switched network. The carriers avoid
application of artificially high accounting rates by creating a
new service category and applying a different and lower ac-
counting rate. Foreign carriers typically have no obligation to
line network means that users, who otherwise
would have to use dial up international telephone
circuits, can opt for specially configured private
line access for functionally equivalent service.
Resellers can expand the reach of leaky private
lines with higher capacity switches. Some carriers
and their regulatory overseers do not object to
this type of "pure resale" that does not enhance
leased lines. 76 Resale stimulates overall capacity
demand, and it can reduce outbound interna-
tional message telephone service ("IMTS") ac-
counting rate liability, particularly where regula-
tory policies block or limit inbound resale.
77
Some carriers, intent on capturing larger market
shares by aggregating and routing regional traffic
through a "hub," may engineer a complex array
of private lines and acquire both half-circuits on
routes to handle accounting rate exempt traffic.
78
Transiting, the routing of traffic destined for an-
other country across domestic facilities, presents
another opportunity for carriers and new interna-
tional telephone entrepreneurs alike to engineer
innovative new arrangements for users.79
Since the early 1990s, the FCC has taken a more
proactive role in accounting rate oversight, look-
ing to encourage carrier and end-user "self help",
by creating routing strategies that collectively
make high accounting rates unsustainable.8 0 The
FCC also adopted a "get tough" policy with inter-
national carriers, including prescribed accounting
justify how the new rate does not discriminate against users
paying higher charges for existing offerings subject to ac-
counting rates.
73 Veronica M. Ahern et al., Developments in the Interna-
tional Marketplace, 427 PLI/PAT 273, 283 (1995).
74 See id. at 325.
75 Id. at 287.
76 Frieden, The Incentive to Cheat, supra note 36, at 122.
77 Id. at 135.
78 Id. at 112.
79 Even companies with limited budgets can get into the
international telecommunications business and exploit high
accounting rate and end user charge differentials. A "boome-
rang box" enables callers, in high cost foreign locations, to
place a call to the United States, hang up and soon receive a
call from the United States with the intended call recipient
on the line. At the micro-level, the foreign caller avoids hav-
ing to pay the significantly higher charge for originating an
international call, the foreign carrier loses some toll revenues
and the USISC handling the international call accrues some
additional toll revenues. At the macro-level, the transaction
contributes to the expanding United States accounting rate
deficit thereby blunting the foreign carrier's revenue losses
and the USISC's revenue gains.
8o See Frieden, The Incentive to Cheat, supra note 36, at 113.
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rates,"' because it had grown impatient with the
pace of reform in private accounting rate negotia-
tions. While the FCC can properly condition
grants of regulatory authorizations and prescribe
rates for the carriers it regulates, attempts to af-
fect the behavior and the financial performance
of other carriers has generated vocal opposition,
at home and abroad, that the Commission failed
to appreciate international comity and national
sovereignty.8 2 Nevertheless, a federal court has af-
firmed the FCC's accounting rate presumptions
and policies." -
Similarly, a FCC proposal to impose reporting
requirements and other means for overseeing the
extent of participation in the U.S. telecommuni-
cations market by foreign-owned firms84 gener-
ated arguments that it would violate the commit-
ment to "national treatment" of foreign
enterprises (applying identical regulatory rights,
responsibilities and opportunities for foreign-
81 The Commission proposed to "establish ... determine
and prescribe just and reasonable accounting rates" if
USISCs and their foreign counterparts failed to negotiate
rates downward to an FCC-determined benchmark range. In
re Regulation of Accounting Rates, Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, 5 FCC Red. 4949, para. 19 (1990).
82 When the FCC attempted to influence the timetable
for construction and activation of the TAT-7 overseas cable
through direct negotiations with foreign governments, for-
eign carriers deemed such activism intrusive of national sov-
ereignty, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia deemed it a violation of the Government in
the Sunshine Act. ITT World Communications, Inc., 77
F.C.C.2d 877, 877-78, para. 2 (1980) (denying petition for
rulemaking on permissible scope of FCC contacts with for-
eign administrations to negotiate delayed deployment of a
trans-Atlantic submarine communications cable), rev'd, ITT
World Communications v. FCC, 699 F.2d 1219 (D.C. Cir.
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 466 U.S. 463 (1984).
83 Cable & Wireless P.L.C. v. FCC, 166 F.3d 1224, 1235
(D.C. Cir. 1999).
84 In re Regulatory Policies and International Telecom-
munications, Notice of Inquiry, 2 FCC Rcd. 1022, 1022, para. 1
(1987), Report and Order and Supplemental Notice of Inquiry, 4
FCC Rcd. 7387, 7387, para. 1 (1988), Order on Reconsideration,
4 FCC Rcd. 323 (1989). The FCC has modified its policies
that impose more extensive oversight of foreign owned carri-
ers providing international services from the United States.
See In re Regulation of International Common Carrier Ser-
vices, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Red. 577, 583, para.
38 n.35 (1992); Report and Order, 7 FCC 7331 (1992) (retain-
ing more burdensome "dominant carrier" oversight only
where the foreign affiliate of a USISC has the ability to dis-
criminate against unaffiliated carriers through control of bot-
tleneck services and facilities in the foreign market).
85 UNITED NATIONS EDUC. SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL
ORG., CULTURE, TRADE AND GLOBALIZATION, QUESTIONS AND
ANswERs, QUESTION 12, WHAT IS TIHE "NATIONAL TREATMENT"
PRINCIPLE?, at http://www.unesco.org/culture/industries/
trade/htmleng/questionl2.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2001).
owned carriers as for domestic carriers). 85 The
FCC subsequently decided to calibrate the scope
of regulatory oversight of foreign carriers to the
degree of market access afforded U.S. carriers,
particularly the extent to which U.S. service prov-
iders may use leased international private lines to
access the PSTN in foreign locales. 86 This mecha-
nism provides strong leverage for achieving mar-
ket access parity by linking the scope of inbound
U.S. market access with reciprocal opportunities
for outbound traffic.
87
Reliance on proliferating private line resale re-
directed the FCC from confrontation with foreign
carriers over their sovereign right to negotiate ac-
counting rates to "procedural reforms that re-
move any U.S. regulatory impediments to lower,
more economically efficient, cost-based account-
ing rates . ,s"88 The Commission assumed that if
resale were available on an equivalent basis, in-
bound and outbound, then the incumbent facili-
The National Treatment principle means that imported
and locally produced goods should be treated equally.
The same should apply to foreign and domestic services,
as well as to foreign and local trademarks, copyrights
and patents. This principle of giving others the same
treatment as one's own nationals is also found in all the
three main WTO agreements (Article III of GATT, Arti-
cle 17 of the CATS and Article III of the TRIPS), al-
though once again it is handled slightly differently in
each of these. National treatment only applies once a
product, service or item of intellectual property has en-
tered the market.
id.
86 See In re Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in
the U.S. Telecommunications Market, Order on Reconsidera-
tion, 15 FCC Red. 18,158, 18,160-65 (2000); Report and Order
on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd. 23,891, 23,894, para. 2 (1997)
(replacing an "effective competitive opportunities" test with a
looser "open entry" standard for WTO Members when con-
sidering foreign carrier entry into the U.S. market by means
of authorizations to provide facilities-based, switched resale,
and resold non-interconnected private line service, authori-
zations to exceed the 25% foreign ownership benchmark and
cable landing licenses).
87 See In re Cable & Wireless, Inc., Memorandum Opinion,
Order and Authorization, 9 FCC Rcd. 7283, 7283, para. 4
(1994); In re Cable & Wireless, Inc., Order and Certification, 8
FCC Rcd. 1664, 1664, para. 2 (1993); In re Fonorola Corp.
Application for Authority Under Section 214 of the Commu-
nications Act to Resell Facilities of Other Common Carriers
to Provide Domestic Carriers Interconnection with Canadian
Carriers, Memorandum Opinion, Order and Certification, 7 FCC
Rcd. 7312 (1992), Order on Reconsideration, 9 FCC Red. 4066,
4071, para. 25 (1994) (authorizing British and Canadian
resellers to provide international service upon finding that
the foreign country on the other end of the circuit provides
equivalent opportunities to U.S. carriers to resell intercon-
nected private lines).
88 In re Regulation of International Accounting Rates, Re-
port and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 3552, 3552, para. 1 (1991).
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ties-based carriers would perceive new incentives
to negotiate lower accounting rates to dissuade
customers from migrating to private line and re-
sale options. Facilities-based international tele-
communications carriers, which face competition
from resellers89 unencumbered by accounting
rate liability, may view high accounting rates as
imposing a floor on how low they can price end
user rates "to prevent diversion of ... customers
to a reseller."90 Presumably, resellers providing
outbound services from the United States will ac-
quire market share, thereby reducing the number
of IMTS outbound minutes subject to accounting
rate settlements. 9' A facilities-based carrier, refus-
ing to negotiate accounting rates closer to cost,
would "receive fewer revenues from its IMTS cus-
tomers and, thus, would wind up with fewer reve-
nues overall."
92
VII. THE INTERNET AS A MEDIUM FOR
ARBITRAGE
The Internet has evolved into a vibrant medium
for communications, entertainment, education
and commerce. One of the primary drivers for the
growing consumer reliance on Internet-mediation
involves the ability of the Internet to offer instant
"real time" delivery of digital packets in addition
to the store and forward, non-real time delivery of
89 K. Cheong & M. Mullins, International Telephone Service
Imbalances, 15 TELECOMM. POL'y 107, 116 (1991) ("Resale [of
leased private lines] would bypass the accounting rate mecha-
nism-a major cost to the traditional carrier mode of opera-
tion-and increase the feasibility of creating unidirectional
traffic channels."). If resale remains unidirectional, United
States facilities-based carriers and consumers will not benefit:
resale occurring only in the inbound United States direction
would increase the United States accounting rate deficit. Re-
sale must be bi-directional to have the effect of "expos[ing]
the differential between tariffs and accounting rates and ulti-
mately force traditional carriers to renegotiate accounting
rates closer to service costs." Id. at 116-17.
90 In re Regulation of International Accounting Rates,
First Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 559, 561, para. 16 (1991)
(stating "[t]o the extent that the accounting rate is above
cost, the underlying carrier will face a constraint on how
much of a reduction in its revenues it can tolerate.").
9' Id.
92 Id.
93 This pricing scenario presupposes that an ISP does
not incur usage sensitive prices for any major element of ser-
vice. For many Asia-Pacific routes, the need to access network
access points in far away locations, such as the United States,
does impose significant costs. To offset the charges of facili-
ties-based telecommunications carriers, ISPs may charge end
users on a usage sensitive basis, for example, an hourly
surcharge after an initial allocation of access time. See Rob
packets in applications like electronic mail. Real
time "streaming" of information packets means
that the Internet can serve as a medium for audio
and video programming and also for telephone
services.
Absent network congestion, the cost to carry or
process an additional minute of Internet traffic
approaches zero because the incremental cost is
near zero.93 This pricing system enhances con-
sumer welfare, stimulates usage and revenue gen-
eration and accrues positive networking externali-
ties. 9 4 The Internet adds thousands of new sites
and users daily with such expanded access oppor-
tunities accruing greater utility for all users. 95 As
long as ample capacity remains available along
with moderate transport and content costs, ISPs
need not meter traffic and can offer service on an
insensitive All You Can Eat ("AYCE") usage basis.
ISPs can offer AYCE service because even as
they have high fixed costs, they incur relatively
low incremental costs absent network congestion.
They can represent that their network extends
globally even though few, outside of a small group
of Tier-i backbone network operators, actually
have built or leased such an extensive array of fa-
cilities. 96 Until recently, ISPs have incurred little
additional expense in providing their customers
opportunities to access Internet networks via in-
cumbent telecommunication carriers' facilities.1
7
Frieden, Does a Hierarchical Internet Necessitate Multilateral Inter-
vention?, 26 N.C.J. INT'L. L. & COM. REG. 361, (2001) [here-
inafter Frieden, Multilateral Intervention?].
94 A positive network externality exists when the cost in-
curred by a user of the Internet does not fully reflect the ben-
efit derived with the addition of new users and points of coi-
munications. See also Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan,
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV.
479 (1998); See generally John Farrell & Garth Saloner, Stand-
ardization, Compatibility and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70
(1985); Michael L. Katz. & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities,
Competition and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985).
95 See Susan Stellin, Compressed Data; Number of New In-
ternet Users is Growing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1990, at C3 (citing
a report released by the Pew Internet and American Life Pro-
ject estimating that the number of American adults with In-
ternet access grew in the last six months of 2000 by 16 mil-
lion).
96 See Frieden, Multilateral Intervention?, supra note 93, at
363.
97 The author acknowledges that "free rider" opportuni-
ties via other ISPs are becoming more scarce, as the Internet
becomes more hierarchical and larger ISPs demand and re-
ceive payments for providing transit services to ISPs with
fewer customers, less bandwidth and limited sources of desir-
able content. See Rob Frieden, Last Days of the Free Ride? The
Consequences of Settlement-Based Interconnection for the Internet,
INFO, Vol. 1, No. 3, 225-38, available at http://
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Accordingly, ISPs have had opportunities to tap
into the same financial and distance-insensitive
service opportunities as telecommunication entre-
preneurs that exploit the porousness of telecom-
munication networks and relative ease in acces-
sing the PSTN. One can consider Internet-
mediated telephony j 8 in the same context as
other technological innovations like call-back,!' '
switched hubbing,"11 1 refile,111l and international
simple resale1t12 that provide new, lower-priced al-
ternatives to the "retail" rate for toll telephone
services.
Internet telephony shifts the balance of market
power from carriers, which traditionally have set
prices on a cost-plus basis, to consumers who may
emphasize price and consider telephony a com-
modity business. If telephony minutes of use be-
come fungible, with voice traffic subordinate to
an increasing volume of data, then service provid-
ers will have limited, if any, ability to saddle users
with rates significantly above cost, despite the fact
that carriers do plow back a large percentage of
any financial surplus to achieve universal service
www.camfordpublishing.com (1999).
98 See Robert Frieden, Dialing for Dollars: Will the FCC Reg-
ulate Internet Telephony?, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER TiciH. L.J. 47,
54 (1997) [hereinafter Frieden, Dialing for Dollars].
99 "'Callback' is a technology used to provide interna-
tional telecommunications service from a foreign country
through a . . . switch [in the U.S. or other nation with low
collection charges and options for private line resale and
routing options that reduce or eliminate accounting rate lia-
bility]." In re Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. In-
ternational Telecom, Ltd., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12
FCC Rcd. 15,001, 15,002, para. 4 n.10 (1997). See also
Frieden, Falling Through the Cracks, supra note 69, at 975;
Frieden, Impact of Call-Back, supra note 46, at 819 (1997); Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development,
Committee for Information, Computer and Communications
Policy, Refile and Alternative Calling Procedures: Their Impact on
Accounting Rates and Collection Charges, OECD/GD(95)19
(Paris, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 OECD Refile and Call-back Re-
port]; Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Develop-
ment, Committee for Information, Computer and Communi-
cations Policy, New Technologies and Their Impact on the
Accounting Rate System, OECD/GD(97)14 (Paris, 1997)
[hereinafter 1997 OECI) Accounting Rate Study].
100 The FCC defined switched hubbing as "the routing of
U.S. switched traffic over U.S. international private lines,
whether resold or facilities based, that terminate in
equivalent countries and then forwarding that traffic to a
third, non-equivalent country by taking at published rates
and reselling the international service of a carrier in the
equivalent country." In re Policy Statement on International
Accounting Rate Reform, Policy Statement, 11 FCC Rcd. 3146,
3147, para. 12, n.9 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Accounting Rate
Policy Statement].
101 Refile or the hubbing of traffic is using one coun-
and infrastructure development objectives.1 0 3
The onset of Internet-mediated telephony has
the potential for bringing to a head the long sim-
mering debate over the propriety of pricing tele-
communication services above cost, in part to pro-
mote a universal service mission. It also may
trigger closer examination of what constitutes the
actual cost a carrier incurs to route a minute of
telecommunication traffic. The 1997 OECD Ac-
counting Rate Study observed:
[A] polarisation [exists] between a group of countries
with relatively competitive prices and low accounting
rates, and a second group of countries with prices sig-
nificantly above cost ... This danger is real, especially
between OECD countries and a number of non-OECD
countries who have difficulty in envisaging the benefits
which they can attain from competitive telecommunica-
tion markets. 114
VIII. INTERNET TELEPHONY THREATENS
THE STATUS QUO
Currently, international accounting rates for
most routes substantially exceed the total cost in-
try to collect traffic and switch this traffic to other coun-
tries ... For example, the price of a call from Denmark-
Finland-Australia is cheaper than a direct call from Den-
mark to Australia (... US $0.46 + US $1.03 compared to
US $2.01). In this case a third country calling service [us-
ing conventional switched services] would be viable hav-
ing a margin of US $ 0.52 per minute.
See 1995 OECD Refile and Call-back Report, supra note 99, at 11.
102 International simple resale ("ISR") involves the use
of a private line by more than one customer with access to
the public switched network at one or both ends. ISR
presents both profit-enhancing opportunities and bypass
threats to facilities-based carriers providing the capacity. On
one hand, "[flacility providers today find that it is more prof-
itable to provide excess capacity to resellers and allow them
to find customers and market this capacity rather than mar-
keting this capacity themselves. Resale allows more seg-
mented and flexible marketing including more market ori-
ented prices." 1997 OECD Accounting Rate Study, supra note
99, at 36. On the other hand, "ISR service provision by-passes
the international charging and settlements system, and there-
for places significant [downward] pressure on accounting
rates." /d. at 38.
I." When service rates decline to levels approximating
marginal cost, carriers do not have revenues available to un-
derwrite public policy objectives no matter how laudable.
Such subsidization must come directly from users in the form
of additional line item charges on their bills. See, e.g., FED-




I 14 1997 OECD Accounting Rate Study, supra note 99, at 32.
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curred by two or more "foreign correspondents"
to switch and route a call from originator to recip-
ient.'0 5 The onset of higher capacity submarine
cables and satellites, coupled with digital signal
processing and switching and circuit multiplica-
tion technologies, have significantly reduced per-
mile and per-call costs,'0 6 although the cost sav-
ings may not be the same for nations lacking the
traffic volumes and funds available to support new
technologies having lower per unit costs. How-
ever, absent competitive or regulatory pressure to
reduce accounting rates and retail collection
charges to levels commensurate with such lower
costs, carriers that terminate more calls than they
originate want to maintain the status quo. 10 7 Ac-
cordingly, accounting rates continue to overstate
cost and overcompensate some operators:
The pace in introducing competition in international
telecommunication markets and the reform of these
markets is slow, and there is an apparent reluctance in
many cases by governments to accelerate reform in this
105 Carrier correspondents "match" half-circuits to erect
a complete link from call originator to call recipient. The
half-circuit concept operates on the presumption that carrier
correspondents achieve a "whole circuit" by linking two half-
circuits at the theoretical midpoint of a submarine cable, or
at the satellite providing the transmission link. In the subma-
rine cable scenario, each carrier has responsibility to secure
access to circuits linking transmission facilities on its territory
to the location where the cable makes its landfall (referred to
as the cablehead), possibly located in a different nation, and
onward to the midpoint. For more background on interna-
tional telecommunications operations and policy, see ROB
FRIEDEN, MANAGING INTERNET-DRIVEN CHANGE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2001); ROB FRIEDEN, INTERNA-
TIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK (1996).
106 See INFORMAL EXPERT GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL SET-
TLEMENTS, INT'L TELECOMM. UNION, THE COST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS, at http://www.itu.int/search (last
visited May 16, 2001) (reporting that the per minute cost for
routing an international telephone call via an INTELSAT sat-
ellite including operating expenses is US $0.02 and that fac-
toring all switching, routing, interconnection and administra-
tive costs, including license fees, advertising and taxes "the
average per minute cost of an international call is probably
around $0.25"). Using a total service long run incremental
cost methodology, which factors in a reasonable contribution
to common costs, the FCC established "upper end" settle-
ment rate benchmarks of 15.4¢ for carriers in upper income
nations; 19.1¢ for carriers in middle-income nations and
23.4¢ for carriers is lower income countries. See In re Interna-
tional Settlement Rates, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 FCC
Rcd. 6184, 6203, para. 47 (1996). The Commission proposed
a 9-22¢ upper range for benchmark settlement rates for car-
riers in upper income nations; 12-26¢ for carriers in middle
income nations and 13-33¢ for carriers in lower income na-
tions. Id. at 6203, para. 48. In its 1997 international settle-
ment policy order the Commission responded to foreign car-
rier and government opposition to its proposed timetable by
creating a fourth income category and by extending the tran-
area. It therefore cannot be expected that significant
changes in prices (collection charges) and accounting
rates will take place given present attitudes and policy
frameworks. 
1 0 8
In the absence of competitive necessity, an ag-
gressive campaign by regulators in sufficient num-
bers or widespread use of Internet telephony and
other arbitrage tactics, many carriers continue to
benefit from traffic retardation strategies that re-
duce outbound calling and expand asymmetry be-
tween inbound and outbound traffic volumes.
1l '
For some nations, purposefully high accounting
rates and commensurately high collection charges
accrue financial dividends by reducing the vol-
ume of outbound traffic that otherwise would off-
set at least a portion of the settlement surplus. I0
Even as they may reduce some high-profit opera-
tor-assisted outbound international calls, call-back
and other call-reorigination services''' increase
the volume of inbound calls, at least some of
which trigger an accounting rate settlement.
112
sition period. See In re International Settlement Rates, Report
and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 19,806, 19,809, para. 6 (1997) [herein-
after 1997 Accounting Rate Report and Order]. The FCC estab-
lished the following benchmarks and timetables for compli-
ance: U.S.-licensed carriers operating on routes to upper
income countries have one year from the effective date of
this Order (until Jan. 1, 1999) to reach the applicable bench-
mark rate of 15¢ with carriers in upper income countries. Id.
at 19,815-16, para. 19. U.S.-licensed carriers have two years,
or until Jan. 1, 2000, to reach the applicable rate of 19¢ with
upper middle income countries, and until Jan. 1, 2001, to
reach the same rate with lower middle income countries. Id.
at 19,881, para. 157. They have until Jan. 1, 2002, to reach
the applicable 23¢ rate with low income countries, and an
additional year, until Jan. 1, 2003, to do so with countries
with a telephone line penetration rate (teledensity) of less
than one. Id.
107 See Lawrence J. Spivak, From International Competitive
Carrier to the WJ1O: A Survey of the FCC's International Telecom-
munications Policy Initiatives 1985-1998, 51 FED. COMM. L.J.
111, 120 (1998).
11O 1997 OECD Accounting Rate Study, supra note 99, at 6.
109 Many international carriers have objected to the
FCC's campaign to reduce international accounting rate tac-
tics on fairness and jurisdictional levels. However, an appel-
late court has ruled that the FCC's settlement rate prescrip-
tion did not violate domestic or international law, nor did it
impose its jurisdiction extraterritorially. See generally Cable
and Wireless P.L.C v. FCC, 166 F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
S11) See Robert Frieden, Without Public Peer, The Potential
Regulatory and Universal Service Consequences of Interest Balkani-
zation, 3 VA. J. L. & TECH. 8, 24-25 [hereinafter Frieden,
Without Public Peer] (1998).
H' 1996 Accounting Rate Policy Statement, 11 FCC Rcd. at
3147, para. 12 ("[C]ountry direct benefits U.S. [and other]
consumers but inflates the settlements deficit by converting
foreign-originated traffic into U.S.-billed calls.").
112 In re International Settlement Rates, Report and Order,
12 FCC Rcd. 19,806 (1997). The traditional settlement rate
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For nations requiring carriers to route return traf-
fic proportionate with what they received in-
bound,""n carriers from other nations with more
outbound traffic than inbound traffic face the po-
tential for expanding settlement deficits if out-
bound calling continues to grow even as demo-
graphic characteristics or regulatory policies
elsewhere continue to dampen demand for in-
bound calling. 1 14 Carriers with inbound traffic
surpluses typically operate in small and develop-
ing countries, but others operate in nations that
appear to have a strategy of deliberately maintain-
ing high accounting and collection rates.' 15
Outbound international call retardation strate-
gies create pent up demand and stimulate ac-
counting rate and collection arbitrage opportuni-
ties and incentives by users and entrepreneurial
carriersI'" to find ways to route traffic that reverse
the accounting rate settlement or avoid triggering
one entirely.' A settlement surplus generates a
source of hard currency for telecommunications
infrastructure development, and such transfer
payments from users in developed nations to car-
riers in developing ones can enhance consumer
welfare and promote networking externalities. On
the other hand, no guarantees exist that only de-
veloping countries will pursue an outbound call
retardation strategy or that beneficiaries of settle-
ment surpluses will use the funds for infrastruc-
ture development as opposed to funding the gen-
eral treasury or stock dividends. Likewise, reduced
outbound international calling may retard trade,
industry and integration of a nation regionally
and globally.
system assumes that a customer's physical location deter-
mines the place of origin of an international call, with the
carrier in the originating country paying a settlement rate to
the carrier in the terminating country. However, service in-
novations such as call-back allow customers to change the
originating country for settlement purposes. The result is
that many more calls are originated for settlement purposes
from countries like the United States with vigorous retail and
wholesale markets than in monopoly markets that lack simi-
lar competition. These traffic routing patterns will only be
exacerbated as countries implement their market access con-
mitments tinder the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement. 1i.
Call-back operators look for opportunities to reduce account-
ing rate exposure, through refile, and to avoid them entirely
by routing traffic via private lines that "leak" into the PSTN.
113 For nations with large populations, high gross domes-
tic products, large expatriate and immigrant communities,
and multiple facilities-based carriers, like the United States,
operators may have collection rates at levels below one-half
the accounting rate. Such carriers expect to recoup out-
bound traffic losses with inbound traffic subject to an ac-
In the accelerated pace of product and service
life cycles common to the Internet, telephone ser-
vices have quickly evolved from an awkward per-
sonal computer-mediated curiosity to a commer-
cial service available not just from computers but
from conventional telephones as well. Internet te-
lephony has the potential to serve as a major
threat to the international accounting rate regime
and possibly as well to how telecommunication
carriers price retail long distance services for two
primary reasons:
(1) the Internet architecture provides for effi-
cient facilities loading, including the abil-
ity of telecommunications networks dedi-
cated for the data services to handle voice
traffic at near zero cost, absent conges-
tion; and
(2) regulatory policies throughout the world
largely exempt providers of Internet ser-
vices from having to subject their traffic to
accounting rate settlements and having to
pay the interconnection charges and con-
tributions to universal telecommunica-
tions service funding imposed on telecom-
munications carriers.
Internet telephony constitutes a formidable ve-
hicle for compressing telecommunication carrier
margins on telephone services. ISPs can easily add
telephony traffic onto their data lines and techno-
logical innovations provide ways to inject Internet
voice traffic into the PSTN for the "last mile" de-
livery to call recipients.' Given the large differ-
ence between ISPs' costs incurred in providing In-
ternet telephony and the retail charges for
counting rate settlement that would overcompensate the car-
rier for terminating the call.
114 See Frieden, The Incentive to Cheat, supra note 36, at
118-19.
11 A thriving international "dial-a-porn" industry has de-
veloped in such diverse and unpredicted places as Guyana,
Russia and Ttvalu in part because operators can tap into a
share of comparatively higher accounting rates well above
the FCC's settlement rate prescription. See Kenneth R. Propp,
Eroding Structure of International Telecommunications Regulation:
The Challenge of Call-Back Services, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 493, 519
(1996).
116 Many facilities-based carriers offer services with lower
per minute charges than conventional, tip International Di-
rect Distance dialing. While such carriers do not want to can-
nibalize high margin services, they recognize the need to
compete with call-back operators.
i17 See Frieden, Without Public Peer, supra note 110, at
124-25.
111 See, e.g., EFFICIENT NETWORKS, VOICE OVER ATM: INTE-
CRATING VOICE AND DATA TRANSMISSION IN DSL SERVICE, at,
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conventional telephone services, especially inter-
national rates, ISPs can profit handsomely by pric-
ing service well below the preexisting retail toll
charge. This exploitation of a wide pricing differ-
ential constitutes a type of arbitrage as the ISP can
make a business case for delivering services to
consumers at significantly lower costs. ISPs have
plenty of margin from which to work due to the
difference between their actual costs and the im-
puted cost established by route specific account-
ing rates based on conventional telephony.
IX. TECHNOLOGY PROVIDES ARBITRAGE
OPPORTUNITIES
Internet telephony uses the digital, packet-
switched nature of the Internet, along with its
routing and addressing standards to provide real
time, audio conferencing.119 Internet switching
and routing technology manages the transmission
and processing of text, graphics, data, audio or




120 See Richard Allan Horning, Has Hal Signed a Contract:
The Statute of Frauds in Cyberspace, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 253, 258 (1996).
The common denominator for e-mail communications
is the use of a standard programming protocol, TCP/IP-
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol-upon
which inter-computer communications are based. The
TCP protocol divides messages into packets, which are
marked with a sequence number and the address of the
recipient. TCP also inserts error control information.
The packets are then sent over the network to the ad-
dressee. The routing of the individual packets varies,
with IP controlling the transport of the packets to the
remote host computer. At the remote host, TCP receives
the packets and checks for errors. When an error occurs,
TCP asks for the particular packet to be re-sent. Once all
the packets have been received, TCP will then use the
sequence number to reconstruct the original message. It
is the job of IP to get the packets from one place to an-
other; it is the job of TCP to manage the flow and insure
that the data are correct.
Id.
121 See Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the In-
ternet, Internet Society, at http://www.isoc.org/internet/
history/brief.html#Origins (Aug. 4, 2000); see also Rob
Frieden, Managing Internet-Driven Change in International Tele-
communications (2001).
122 See Robert D. Fram et al., Altered States: Electronic Com-
merce and Owning The Means of Value Exchange, 1999 STAN.
TECH. L. REiv. 2, XI. Appendix C: Glossary of Terms, at http:
//str.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/99_STLR_2/index.htm
(1999).
Packets are network message fragments including the
message fragment itself, a header with identifying infor-
vides a standard vehicle for subdividing content,
such as a voice conversation, into a stream of
packets that are routed via any available path be-
tween the sender and intended call recipient.
1
1
Each packet has space reserved for destination in-
formation so that intermediary routing facilities
can read "header" data to determine how and
where to send the packets toward their intended
destination. 122 Headers include a sequence of dig-
its that correspond to an Internet address, much
like the numbering sequence in direct distance di-
aling via telephone. 123 However, IP addresses do
not correspond to a specific geographical region
as provided by telephone area codes.
Packet switching efficiently uses available
switching and routing capacity. Likewise, it can
operate despite outages, blockages and busy con-
ditions because the Internet Protocol addressing
scheme makes it possible for multiple efforts to
route traffic onward in the event that initial ef-
forts fail. 12 4 Resending misdelivered or un-
received packets and routing them via different
mation about the message fragment, error control data,
and addressing data. As a message fragment travels
along the network, each layer or gateway adds routing
information to the packet before passing it to the next
destination. Packets are not full messages; each message
a user sends (for example, a typical e-mail communica-
tion) is broken up into packets and transmitted across
the Internet via the best available routes.
Id.
123 SeeJonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legit-
imacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 194 (2000).
In any system of networked computing, there has to be
some mechanism enabling one computer to locate an-
other. If I want to send e-mail to a buddy in Boise, the
system needs to have some way to find his mail server so
that it can direct the information there. Internet engi-
neers came up with this solution: Each 'host' computer
connected to the Internet was assigned an Internet pro-
tocol (IP) address, which consisted of a unique 32-bit
number, usually printed in dotted decimal form, such as
128.127.50.224. Dr. Jon Postel of the University of South-
ern California's Information Sciences Institute (ISI) as-
sumed the task of assigning blocks of IP addresses to
computer networks. Because no two computers had the
same IP address, it was possible to locate any computer
on the Internet simply by knowing its IP address. TCP/
IP made possible a system of routing that permitted a
user to dispatch a message onto the Internet, knowing
only the IP address of the computer he wished to reach,
with confidence that the message would eventually reach
its intended destination.
Id.
124 SeeJonathan Weinberg, The Internet and "Telecommuni-
cations Services," Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges,
and Other Flotsam Of The Regulatory System, 16 YALE J. ON REG.
211, 215 (1999).
The Internet is a network of networks, communicating
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and possibly circuitous links requires software
processing to reassemble the packets in proper or-
der.125 For traffic and services that do not require
immediate, real-time delivery-such as electronic
mail-possible delays and reassembly present lit-
tle problem. However, Internet telephony re-
quires immediate, real time delivery of the pack-
ets in their proper order. Any delay, loss or
improper sequencing of packets will result in dis-
tortion, or the temporary loss of the audio stream.
Heretofore, Internet telephony has lacked the
quality, reliability and security to be considered
comparable to conventional telephone services.'
2 6
Traditional telephone services use circuit switch-
ing that sets up a dedicated link between call orig-
inator and call recipient. 127 This technology pro-
vides high-quality service and reliability because a
dedicated pathway exists, as opposed to the vir-
tual, "on the fly" links provided via the Internet.
However, a dedicated pathway may be technologi-
cally wasteful in the sense that switching, routing
using packet-switching technology. A key part of that
technology is the Internet Protocol (IP), which provides
the intelligence to transmit packets successfully even if
source and destination are on different physical net-
works. IP converts multiple physical networks, which
may run on completely different hardware, into a single
logical network. Any computer on any of the underlying
networks can thus communicate with any other. On a
more prosaic level, the Internet is a set of computers,
packet routers, and the physical communications paths
(such as copper wire, or fiberoptic cable, or terrestrial
wireless, or satellite transmission, or coaxial cable) con-
necting them. A packet router is a data communications
device whose job it is to tell packets where to go; each
time a packet hits a router, the router examines that
packet's address information and determines where to
send it next.
Id. (citations omitted).
125 Ari Lanin, Who Controls the Internet? States' Rights And
The Reawakening of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1423, 1425-26 (2000).
Each computer on the Internet is connected to a small
number of other computers. If one information route is
down or congested, smart networking allows for infor-
mation to take any number of alternative routes. Seg-
mented messages ensure that a single message will never
be sent in a single block, but instead will be broken
down into smaller blocks known as 'packets.' When a
message is sent, these 'packets' are individually trans-
ferred and, inevitably, distributed through different
routes on the network. When all the packets arrive at the
destination colnputer, they are reassembled into the
original message.
Id.
126 See generally Frieden, Dialing for Dollars, supra note 98;
Dennis W. Moore, Jr., Regulation of the Internet and Internet Te-
lephony Through the hnposition of Access Charges, 76 TEX. L. REV.
183, 184-85 (1997).
and transmission capacity lies dormant during
pauses in a conversation.28 Packet switching tech-
nology efficiently fills in gaps with other traffic so
that traffic may traverse different routes and ar-
rive at different times in getting to the same desti-
nation.1 29 In circuit switching, all parts of a traffic
stream traverse the same pathway, which provides
greater quality assurance.13-
What Internet telephony lacks in quality of ser-
vice and reliability it makes up in lower costs and
the ability to narrow the gap between carriers'
costs and retail charges. 131 However, some users
may care more about reliability of service and less
about savings. Currently, Internet traffic cannot
be easily classified by priority of service or by type
of application. Best efforts at routing of traffic
may not provide the security, safety and reliability
a user may require. For those willing to take the
qualitative risk, the financial savings are signifi-
cant.'3 2 However, Internet telephony consumers
have to incur some initial, up-front costs. Unlike
127 Peter H. Salus, The Net: A Brief History Of Origins, 38
JURIMETRICSJ. 671, 674 (1998).
When you place a phone call, your instrument connects
to a local switch. If this is a long distance call, the switch
puts the call onto an appropriate trunk, and at the other
end another switch connects you to the other local num-
ber. For the duration of that call, you are in control of
that circuit. This is therefore called circuit switching.
Id.
128 In other words a circuit switched link cannot carry
other traffic even when it is not being used. Circuit switching
establishes dedicated pathways that by nature cannot be
shared.
129 See Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining the Fu-
ture in Terms of the Past, 7 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 37, 50
(1999).
13( Circuit switching may require the use of several dif-
ferent telecommunication network facilities along the link
from call originator to call recipient. However, no uncer-
tainty exists as to who provides the switching and traffic rout-
ing functions as would be the case for Internet traffic. Con-
ventional dial up telephone traffic traverses as few as one
carrier's network while Internet traffic can transit an indeter-
minate number.
III The cheapest form of Internet telephony imposes no
charge beyond the stink investment in a personal computer
and Internet access. See generally Internet and Telecoms Con-
vergence Consortium at http://itel.mit.edu/ (last visited
Apr. 20, 2001); WORKING PARTY ON TELECOMMUNICATION AND
INFORMATION SERVICES POLICIES, DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY, INTERNET VOICE TELEPHONY DE-
VELOPMENTS, at http://www.oecd.org//dsti/sti/it/cm/prod/
tisp97-3e.pdf (1998) (giving additional background on In-
ternet telephony) (explaining Internet Voice Telephony De-
velopments).
1_32 Even when Internet-mediated telephone services are
accessible from conventional telephones, in lieu of personal
computers, the cost savings are significant. For example,
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conventional telephone service, the cheapest
types of Internet-mediated telephony require a
significant initial capital outlay of about $2,000 for
a personal computer, modem, sound card, speak-
ers, microphone, software and Internet access.
Conventional telephone services use a telephone
handset, an inexpensive, "dumb" terminal, but
users incur per minute charges that can exceed
$1.00 a minute for many international destina-
tions. Internet telephony provided on a conven-
tional dial up basis requires an ISP to install de-
vices that can convert circuit switched telephone
traffic into packets and vice versa. 133 Additionally,
these devices must provide a routing function, us-
ing the Internet Protocol to bring traffic to a facil-
ity (commonly referred to as a point of presence)
in the vicinity of the call recipient.
X. FINANCIAL AND REGULATORY
ARBITRAGE AND THE POTENTIAL
IMPACT ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PRICING
Internet telephony provides profitable opportu-
nities for incumbents and newcomers alike to of-
fer services functionally equivalent to conven-
tional telephony, but treated in a manner that
subjects the service to little or no regulation and
accrues lower operational costs. 134 Entrepreneurs
savor the opportunity to exploit financial and reg-
ulatory anomalies and asymmetries in telecommu-
nications .135
Internet telephony has the potential to migrate
traffic from conventional telecommunications
networks. 136 Incumbent carriers surely do not
want to encourage such a migration as it will cre-
net2phone, an Internet telephony provider, currently adver-
tises a 3.9V per minute rate for calls within the United States,
with many international calls costing less than 25¢ per min-
ute. The retail, occasional calling rates of conventional carri-
ers exceed these rates by several hundred percent. See
net2phone, at http://www.net2phone.coni (last visited Apr.
20, 2001).
133 See Robert Scoble, Internet Telephony Primer, at http://
www.techtv.com/callforhelp/projects/story/
0,23008,2190782,00.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2001) (provid-
ing a technical background on how Internet telephony
works).
134 See Nicholas C. Spatafore, Stuck in the Middle, TELEPH-
ONY, Aug. 28, 2000, available at 2000 WL 7092846 [hereinaf-
ter Spatafore.
135 For example, an entrepreneur could lease private
lines, link them with the PSTN and offer a long distance tele-
phone service to individual consumers who otherwise would
ate downward pressure on all telephone toll rates
and cannibalize retail rates.3 7 On the other hand,
incumbent carriers probably will determine that
they are better served financially by providing the
transmission capacity for Internet telephony, al-
beit at lower margins, than if they lose customers'
traffic entirely. The massive increase in domestic
and international broadband telecommunication
capacity reflects the view that carriers can make
up in volume what they will lose in margin.
3
XI. THE PROBLEMS IN REGULATORY
ASYMMETRY
Any regulatory regime applied exclusively to In-
ternet applications runs the risk of creating a di-
chotomy in regulatory rights and responsibilities
between providers of functionally equivalent ser-
vices. Many of the services available via the In-
ternet provide a faster, better, cheaper and
smarter option to preexisting services. The In-
ternet provides a convenient, user-friendly me-
dium for acquiring news and entertainment and
engaging in all sorts of commercial transactions.
A bias or intention not to regulate or to regulate
such activities lightly may contrast significantly
with a preexisting and more intrusive regulatory
model. Governments should not automatically ex-
tend the application of legacy regulatory re-
gimes 39 to Internet-mediated equivalent services.
Also, governments should not deregulate incum-
bent services simply because Internet options
have become available, while governments have
opted to apply a less burdensome regulatory re-
gime to Internet services.
The onset of Internet-mediated services does
not qualify for bulk discounts offered only to high volume
private line users.
136 See Tuan N. Samahon, The First Amendment Case
Against FCC IP Telephony Regulation, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 493,
496-97 (1999).
137 See Spatafore, supra note 134.
138 See id.
139 See Jason Oxman, FCC OPP Working Paper 31, The
FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet, 24-25, at http://
www.fcc.gov/opp/workingp.html (1999).
New technologies, while perhaps similar in appearance
or in functionality, should not be stuffed into what may
be ill-fitting regulatory categories in the name of regula-
tion. Rather, the Commission should continue the ap-
proach of studying new technologies and only stepping
in where the purpose for which the Commission was cre-




present a regulatory challenge to governments,
particularly those disinclined to treat Internet-me-
diated services as equivalents to services transmit-
ted and delivered via traditional media. The juxta-
position of different regulatory regimes typically
also creates an asymmetry that has the potential
for tilting the competitive playing field in favor of
the less regulated service. 14'" To the extent regula-
tion can impose financial and operational bur-
dens, the service provider subject to greater regu-
lation typically suffers a competitive disadvantage
vfs-a-vis the less regulated operator. 14  Govern-
ments should generate compelling justifications
for establishing different regulatory regimes in
view of the potential for such asymmetry to im-
pact the marketplace attractiveness of one service
vfs-a-vfs others.
Regulatory dichotomies work best when techno-
logical categories remain discrete and absolute. 142
But they surely do not work when technological
convergence results in porous service categories
and diversification by operators. 43 When cable
telephone and ISPs offer telephone services func-
140 Kasey A. Chappelle, Comment, The End of the Begin-
ning. Theories and Practical Aspects of Reciprocal Compensation for
Internet Traffic, 7 CoMMLAw CONSPEcrus 393, 406 (1999)
("For convergence to be a reality, diverging regulatory struc-
tures cannot exist for communications systems that provide
essentially the same service.").
141 See Francois Bar et al., Defending the Internet Revolution
in the Broadband Era: When Doing Nothing is Doing Harm, Econ-
omy, at http://e-conomy.berkeley.edu/publications/wp/
ewpl2.html (1999) (supporting symmetrical regulatory re-
quirements for Internet access between common carriers
and cable television systems).
142 For example a regulatory dichotomy may impose
greater regulatory burdens on an incumbent to promote
market entry by competitors using new technologies. Advo-
cates for asymmetric regulation may:
insist on the need to counterbalance the competitive ad-
vantages enjoyed by the incumbents by virtue of the
favorable position assured them by the monopoly condi-
tions reigning in the [current] market .... [It] will be
necessary to compensate for the advantages enjoyed by
the incumbent by way of a series of compensatory mea-
sures in favour of the newcomers.
Antonio Perrucci & Michela Cimatoribus, Competition Conver-
gence and Asymmety in Telecommunications Regulation, 21
TELECOMM. PoL'V 493, 497 (1997).
1413 Currently many cable television operators have up-
graded their networks to provide access to the Internet. Con-
simers typically do not perceive a significant difference be-
tween the types of Internet access provided by cable
television companies on a non-common carrier basis and that
provided by telephone companies still regulated as common
carriers.
144 SeeJames H. Lister, The Rights of Common Carriers and
the Decision Whether to Be a Common Carrier or a Non-Regulated
Communications Provider, 53 FED. COMM. L. J. 91, 96 (2000).
tionally similar to that available from telephone
companies, regulators cannot sustain preexisting
service dichotomies. Heretofore, government reg-
ulators have assumed that incumbent telephone
service providers, which have dominant market
shares, should operate as common carriers and of-
fer the best technologies and wherewithal to
achieve universal service goals.' 44 Regulators typi-
cally assume that market entrants, like ISPs, other
enhanced service providers and resellers of basic
transmission capacity, do not have the potential to
acquire a dominant market share, or that they of-
fer ancillary, non-common carrier services.'
45
While incumbent telephone companies incur sig-
nificant financial duties to serve costly remote ar-
eas, the newcomers enjoy exemptions from hav-
ing to pay charges for accessing the PSTN and
from contributing to universal service funding.
1 46
These ventures qualified for such exemptions on
grounds that they did not offer telephone service
even though their offerings might require access
to the PSTN.1
47
When ISPs offer consumers telephone service
The difference between dominant and non-dominant
carrier regulation is striking, particularly in the area of
economic regulation. Dominant carriers are subject to
price cap or rate-of-return regulation at the federal level.
To change rates, a dominant carrier must file its tariff
and may wait up to several weeks before the new prices
go into effect. With few exceptions, non-dominant car-
rier prices are not regulated, and where tariffs are still
required changes can be made effective the day after the
amendment is filed. The FCC rarely decides to review
closely or declare unlawful a provision in a non-domi-
nant carrier tariff; one FCC Commissioner recently
noted that it has happened only twice in the many years
(more than a decade) since the FCC adopted the domi-
nant/non-dominant classification system.
Id.
145 SeeJames B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for The Last
Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17
YALE J. ON REG. 39, 66 (2000).
The rules that emerged from the Computer Inquiry pro-
ceedings drew a distinction between 'basic' and 'en-
hanced' telecommunications services. Basic services
were those that involved only the transmission of sound
or data unchanged from beginning to end. Enhanced
services were all other services that 'acted on the format,
content, code, protocol, or similar aspects of the sub-
scriber's transmitted information; provided the sub-
scriber with additional, different, or restructured infor-
mation; or involved subscriber interaction with stored
information.' Basic transmission services were subject to
the 1934 Act's common carrier regulations; enhanced ser-
vices were exempt from regulation under the 1934 Act.
Id. (emphasis added).
146 See Frieden, Regulatory Models Diverge, supra note 6, at
395-97.
147 See Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. at 11,541, 11,545,
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equivalents, which link PSTN access with Internet-
mediated telephony, preexisting regulatory ex-
emptions tilt the competitive playing field to the
ISPs' advantage. Should significant telephony traf-
fic volumes migrate to routings exempt from uni-
versal service contribution requirement, the sum
of funds available to achieve the universal service
mission will decline. The potential for declining
universal service funds occurs just as many govern-
ments have articulated a broader and more ambi-
tious universal service mission for all citizens to
have access to both basic telephone service and
advanced Internet services.
XII. Regulatory Opportunism
Some providers of Internet-mediated services
enjoy the opportunity to provide competitive,
functional equivalents to regulated offerings with-
out the same regulatory burdens. Absent adjust-
ments in the legal and regulatory arena, these
ventures, typically market entrants, may achieve
commercial success without having developed a
faster, better, more efficient and more convenient
innovation. They may offer something technologi-
cally and operationally awkward, but nevertheless
cheaper, because regulatory classifications ex-
empt the operator from having to pay regulator-
imposed fees.
Legislative changes in telecommunications laws
occur most infrequently, and regulatory lag fre-
quently creates a significant time period, in
which changed technological and marketplace
conditions increasingly contrast with the regula-
tory status quo. During such periods of delayed
adjustment, the regulatory process may favor one
competitor over others. This can most likely occur
when marketplace conditions trigger new compet-
itive opportunities and when technological con-
vergence eliminates barriers to market entry or
market segmentation.
XIII. Conclusion
The FCC prudently refrains from extending
"legacy" regulation to new technologies and ser-
vices that may resemble something offered by in-
cumbents. Surely regulation can drag and thwart
marketplace development, and conversely regula-
paras. 83, 90 (1998).
1481n a price squeeze situation, a vertically integrated
tory forbearance can incubate and nurture new
technologies and services. However, at some point
newcomers may so develop market share and ser-
vice functionally equivalent to what incumbents
offer but without incurring anything like the regu-
latory burdens incumbents bear. At this point,
regulatory asymmetry provides for less market-
place incubation and more marketplace distor-
tion.
The private carrier, enhanced service provider
and interstate service classification each provided
rational exemptions from more costly and intru-
sive regulatory classifications. But regulatory arbi-
trageurs came to understand that qualifying for
these classifications provided "back door" oppor-
tunities to acquire market share and profits. It ap-
pears that the FCC has emphasized the potential
for private carriers, CLEC affiliates of ISPs, call-
back operators and Internet telephony providers
to provide both service diversity and financial sav-
ings to consumers. Yet, the Commission does not
assess whether these operators might have gener-
ated more consumer welfare enhancements if
they had been forced to comply with legacy regu-
lations and been motivated to join with incum-
bents to streamline or reduce them in view of in-
creasingly robust competition.
Conferring too comfortable an unregulated
niche or financial windfall eliminates the incen-
tive for ventures to innovate, become facilities-
based operators and diversify. Unless and until an
arbitrage opportunity closes, resellers, call-back
operators and Internet telephony vendors can
possibly do better by conserving capital, not in-
vesting heavily in facilities and developing other
indicia of similarity with incumbents lest they lose
a regulation conferred competitive advantage.
At some point the FCC unwittingly tilts the
competitive playing field in favor of players clever
enough to craft a service definition that permits
aggressive competition with incumbent services,
but which qualifies them for a host of arbitrary
and anomalous loopholes that exempt or reduce
the cost and inconvenience in regulatory compli-
ance. Incumbents may suffer simply because of
the legacy regulations that continue to apply
rather than because they have greater market
share, the ability to exploit a bottleneck or handi-
cap market entrants with price squeezes.
148
firm with market power over an essential upstream inptut
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raises the price of this input to rivals competing in down-
stream retail markets. The increased cost of this essential
input forces downstream rivals to raise their retail prices.
The vertically integrated firm is then in a position to un-
dercut the downstream rivals in retail markets and
thereby increase market share and profits.
Michael Kende, FCC OPP Working Paper 32, The Digital
Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 23, at http://
www.fcc.gov/opp/workingp.html (2000). See also, United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 437-38 (2d Cir.
1945) (articulating a four-part test for price squeeze: (1) a
firm has monopoly power with respect to one product; (2) its
price for that product is higher than a "fair price;" (3) that
product is required to compete in a second market where the
monopolist itself competes; and (4) the monopolist's price in
the second market is so low that competitor's cannot match it
and still earn a "living profit").
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